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Article 2

Poor Relief Laws
By PAUL M.

BUTLER

Not in the past twenty years has there been such frequent resort to poor relief statutes as in the past eight
months, in the face of overwhelming demand upon the poor
relief agencies of each community. The infrequency with
which both the lawyer and the student of law come into contact with statutes designed to provide for the relief of
paupers under certain conditions has prompted the conclusion that a brief discussion of an actual case and the nature
and niethod of relief, and the conditions upon which it is
to be given, involved therein, would prove interesting and
illuminating.
The history of such legislation takes us back to the time
of King Henry VIII in the early part of the sixteenth century when the English parliament imposed upon society as
a whole the legal duty of relieving the poor, thus making
paupers a charge upon the community in which they lived.
Prior to the enactment of this measure, at common law, the
poor were not entitled to aid as a matter of right. Charity
was considered to be a function of the church, and the state
did not concern itself with the relief of those in need. It is
said that the ancient rulers had decreed that "the poor should
be sustained by parsons, rectors of the church, and by parishoners, so that none of them die for want of sustenance." '
The advent of legislation, however, along these lines, affected a change in popular sentiment, and it soon became
universally recognized that the poor should be relieved and
sustained by society through the agency of some governmental unit.
On this subject, Blackstone is quoted as having made
the following statement in 1765: "The law not only regards
life and member and protects every man in the enjoyment
of them, but also furnishes him with everything necessary
for their support. For there is no man so indigent or
wretched, but he may demand a supply sufficient for all the
necessaries of life from the more opulent part of the com1 188 N.W. (Iowa), 132
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munity, by means of the several statutes enacted for the relief of the poor." 2 We may conclude, therefore, that the
legal obligation was created only by statute, and that, in the
absence thereof, no such obligation exists.
Fifteen years after the passage of an act of Congress
in 1816, authorizing the formation of a state by the people
of the Territory of Indiana, and the adoption of an ordinance by the representatives of the people of the territory
in the same year to form such state to be known as the State
of Indiana, the General Assembly thereof in its session of
1831 enacted a complete statute, entitled "An Act for the
Relief of the Poor." 3 By this act, the township overseers of
the poor, which office was created by Section 20 of Chapter
XX of the Revised Laws of Indiana, 1831,' were directed
to investigate the condition of poor people within the township; to farm adult paupers out for hire on contract each
year; to put "out as apprentices, all poor children whose parents are dead" or whose parents were unable to keep them;
to keep a poor record; to remove from the township any
pauper who had not a legal settlement therein to the place"
where he, she or they, was or were last legally settled"
through certain proceedings prescribed. The act also included provisions concerning litigation by the poor "in
forma pauperis," temporary aid to transient poor, poor
asylums, and other elements of poor relief.
Perhaps, the most interesting phase of such legislation
which has been adopted by practically every state in the
Union, is the matter of the removal of a pauper who, by
virtue of certain conditions, is not entitled to relief from the
township in which he resides at the time of his request or
need for aid. The question of the constitutionality of such a
statute is often raised and presents an interesting study. Despite the objections frequently made, only one case directly
considering the constitutional rights of a pauper sought to
be removed thereunder has been found.
Under the present statutes of Indiana, which were
enacted in 1901, 5 "upon-complaint of any overseer of the
poor, any justice of the peace may, by his warrant directed
2
3
4
5

1 Blackstone Comm. 131.
Rev. Laws of Indiana, 1831, P. 380.
P. 13a.
Burns' Indiana Statutes-1926-Sec. 12279.
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to and to be executed by any constable, or by any other person therein designated, cause any poor person found in the
township of such overseer, likely to become a public charge
and having no legal settlement therein, to be sent and conveyed, at the expense of the county, to the place where such
person belongs, if the same can be conveniently done; but if
he or she can not be so removed, such person shall be relieved by such overseer whenever such relief is needed."
For the purposes of this poor relief act, the legislature
declared a legal settlement 6 to be acquired by a male adult
within a township by a residence therein for the period of
one year, without interruption. Any male adult, therefore,
who had not resided in the same township uninterruptedly
for one year, had no legal settlement therein, and, if he was
likely to become a public charge, was subject to the proceedings for removal "to the place where he belongs."
In order to make an application of these statutory provisions, let us take the actual facts of a proceedings of this
nature recently instituted, using exact circumstances of the
case, and consider the matter from its inception to its final
determination.
After due investigation and examination into the condition of a family of seven children and father and mother,
the overseer of the poor filed in the proper justice court his
affidavit to the effect that the father of said family had no
legal settlement within the township, but had a legal settlement in Smith county, Missouri, and that said father was
likely to become a public charge. The defendant pauper
appeared by an attorney who demanded a trial upon the
affidavit. The statute, as above quoted, contained no provisions as to a hearing or trial. The request was granted,
however, and a full and complete hearing was had, with
witnesses -testifying on behalf of the overseer of the poor
and the pauper himself.
It was the contention of counsel for the person sought
to be deported that: 1. The defendant was not a public
charge, and was not likely to become one; 2. The poor deportation statute of Indiana was violative of the Constitu6 Burns' Indiana Statutes-1926-Sec. 12259.
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tion of the United States, the fifth and fourteenth amendments being specifically mentioned. The basis of the latter
contention was that the statute did not provide for a hearing
or trial; gave the pauper no relief from the final order of
the justice such as an appeal; and, in general, was a denial
of liberty without due process of law.
The trial justice found from the evidence that the defendant had no legal settlement within the township; that
his last legal settlement had been in Smith county, Missouri,
where he had resided for a period of twenty years; that he
had been absent from Missouri for a period of fourteen
months, during which time he had lived in Terre Haute,
Indiana, one month, Bedford, Indiana, one month, Troy,
Ohio, two months, and in the township of his residence at
the time for the past ten *months. The evidence disclosed
that he had left his legal settlement in December, 1928; that
his faniily had not left there until February 27, 1929; that
his family had gone from Missouri to their then place of
residence and, therefore, had not yet acquired a legal settlement within the township where the proceeding was instituted.
The evidence preponderated to show that the defendant
and his family were likely to become public charges upon
the township.
The justice court held that the statute did not violate
the Constitution of the United States. The function to be
performed by the justice of the peace was held to be merely
an administrative one, prescribed by statute, and the issuance of the warrant for the deportation of the pauper was
not the exercise of a judicial power. Because of this fact, it
was not necessary that the statute provide an appeal for' the
aggrieved party, and the failure to so provide a hearing
and appeal was not a denial of due process. Any person
aggrieved by the exercise of an administrative function by
any public officer has a proper and adequate remedy.
The only case touching upon the constitutionality of a
similar statute is Lovell v. Seeback, 46 N. W. (Minn.) 23,
in which the court refused to sustain the objections to the
statute on the ground that it was a denial of due process.
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In that statute the board of county commissioners and chairman thereof were each given the right to issue an order to
the sheriff or constable of the same county directing that
the pauper be deported, if, prior to that time, the poor person had been requested to remove from the county and had
failed so to do. The court held that the issuance of the warrant was in the exercise of an administrative power, and
that the term "due process" is "Not strictly limited to judicial process or proceedings"; that, in other words, the administrative function of issuing the warrant was due process.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota cites the opinion of
Justice Cooley of the Supreme Court of Michigan in
Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201, as follows: "... . Administrative process of the customary sort is as much due
process of law as judicial process. .

.

. A day in court is

a matter of right in judicial proceedings, but administrative
proceedings rest upon different principles. The party affected by them may always test their validity by a suit instituted for that purpose, and this is supposed to give him
ample protection."
The justice court, in final determination upon the application for deportation, issued a warrant for the removal
of the pauper to his last legal settlement on the ground that
the person was in such a state of poverty that he was likely
to become a public charge; that it was not merely a possibility, which is insufficient basis for deportation, but a
strong probability. Upon the issuance of said warrant, the
pauper prayed an appeal to the Circuit Court of the county
in which the township was situated, which appeal was denied, inasmuch as the statute made no provision therefor.
The pauper then made application to the circuit court for a
temporary' restraining order and permanent injunction
against the constable charged with the execution of the
warrant.
The restraining order was issued and, upon a hearing
upon the affidavits of the pauper and the poor-overseer, the
circuit court granted a permanent injunction against the
execution of the warrant, thus prohibiting the deportation
of the pauper. The court did not touch upon the constitutionality of the statute or the question of likelihood of the

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

pauper becoming a public charge, but based its conclusion
upon a plain misapplication of the well-settled principles
of law to the actual facts of the case in regard to the acquisition and loss of legal settlement.
The court held that legal settlement in a township is
acquired by one who resides continuously within the township for a period of twelve months and that the statutes of
Missouri provided such a provision for legal settlement. The
court said: "It is noted by the statute that no person shall
be deemed an inhabitant within the meaning of the statute,
who has not resided in the county for the space of twelve
months next preceding the time of any order being made respecting such poor person." That is the provision of the
Missouri statutes, referring to the condition essential to the
acquisition of a legal settlement for the purposes of poor
relief in that state, that condition being inhabitation within
the county for the space of twelve months before the time
any order is made (by a Missouri court) respecting such
poor person. But such a statute was never intended to be
construed as affecting legal settlement once acquired in
Missouri by reason of twelve months of inhabitation. It referred to the acquisition of legal settlement in that state,not its loss.
Construing this statutory provision to mean a loss of
legal settlement in any county of Missouri by not having
been a resident of the Missouri county for the space of twelve
months next preceding the time of entry of any order being
made respecting such poor person, and construing the order
referred to as meaning the order of a court of any state, and
applying such an interpretation to this case, the court concluded as follows: The pauper left Missouri in December,
1928, leaving his family of six children and his wife in the
place of their residence for the past twenty years; went to
Terre Haute, Indiana, and stayed there for a period of two
months; thereafter, went to Bedford, Indiana, where he remained for one month; next, he went to Troy, Ohio, and
remained there for about thirty days, leaving there and
going to the township in Indiana in which the proceedings
were instituted, arriving there April 12, 1929. In the meantime, March 1, 1929, his family had moved to said township.
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The original proceedings were begun about February "8,
1930, which time the family had lived in the township eleven
months, and the father himself approximately ten months.
The basic conclusion of the court was that the pauper had
been away from Smith county, Missouri, for fourteen
months, and had, therefore, lost his legal settlement therein,
because, according to the interpretation given to the statute,
the pauper had not been an "inhabitant of said county for
the space of twelve months next preceding"; that under the
Indiana statute a pauper who had no legal settlement actually or whose last legal settlement could not be determined,
could not be deported.
The general proposition of law, contrary to the conclusion of the court, is that a person's legal settlement is not
lost except upon the acquisition by him of a new settlement.7 According to this general rule, the pauper did not
lose his legal settlement in Missouri, as he had not acquired
one in the township of his residence.
The circuit court held that a Missouri statute provided
that a legal settlement in any county in said state may be
lost by absence or abandonment for a period of twelve
months next preceding. But the family of the pauper had
remained in Missouri and was receiving relief and aid from
poor agencies in that state within one year next preceding
the application for deportation, and during the period of the
father's absence and temporary residence in Terre Haute
and Bedford, Indiana.
The intent of a party must he considered in the determination of acquisition or abandonment of a legal settlement. And that intent to acquire a new, or abandon an
old, legal settlement may be determined from circumstances
indicating the true intention. In this case, the absence of
the father and his short stays in each of the three towns mentioned and the fact that his family remained in Missouri, indicate no intention on his part to abandon his legal settlement in Missouri,-at least, not until March 1, 1929, when
his family moved from Missouri to the township where deportation proceedings were begun, or to maintain any other
7 Paupers-48 C.J. 486-Followed by thirteen states and England.
8 Paupers--48 C.J. 469 et seq
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place of residence for the purpose of acquiring a legal settlement until after joining his family in the township about
April 1, 1929. It has been repeatedly held that the residence
(settlement) of a person having a family is usually determined by the place where his family resides.' The pauper
himself, in this case, testified that he had no intention of
abandoning his home in Missouri when he first left there
and went to Terre Haute, and that he had no intention of
acquiring a legal settlement or permanent place of residence
until he joined his family in the township. It seems, therefore, that the facts and circumstances of the case justly warranted a finding that the pauper had not lost his legal settlement in Missouri, had acquired none in the township of
his then residence, and that he should be returned to the
place where he belonged, so as not to deprive others in the
township who had legal settlements therein of relief sorely
needed, which relief was not. at the time, available in proportion to the unusual demand.
The statutory laws of the various states governing the
means and methods of relief for poverty-stricken people
through a governmental unit such as the township, and the
history forming a background for such legislation provide
an interesting story for anyone interesfed in the vital problems of social welfare of the present day. -Mucfi in the way
of supplement and amendment of the existing laws may
yet be anticipated and desired.

9 Paupers-48 CJ. 470.

